Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
This paper models a two-region world economy in the tradition of the new open economy macroeconomics, with the aim of investigating the macroeconomic consequences of the establishment of a monetary union when labour markets are unionised.
In the literature on international monetary policy games, the switch from uncoordinated national monetary policies to a monetary union is generally argued to lead to higher in ‡ation. One reason why the formation of a monetary union is likely to raise in ‡ation for a given level of employment is that the uni…ed central bank's incentive to boost employment is no longer restrained by the cost of the exchange rate depreciation that follows unilateral monetary expansions ). Higher in ‡ation may then result as a consequence of rational agents anticipating the central bank's attempt to create surprise in ‡ation.
A further channel leading to higher in ‡ation has been recently stressed in the literature on strategic wage setting. Basically, it is argued that wage setters may be induced to behave more aggressively in a monetary union as they perceive an increase in their wages to have a smaller impact on the union-wide in ‡ation rate relative to the one on their country-speci…c in ‡ation rate. 1 As the move to a monetary union alters the strategic environment faced by the central bank and the labour unions, the incentives of both actors should be explicitly accounted for when analysing the macroeconomic impact of such a monetary policy regime shift. In this paper, we accomplish this task in the simplest general-equilibrium setup, where regions have asymmetric technological as well as institutional labour market features, namely di¤erent degrees of monopoly power in the factor market and various levels of wage centralisation.
While moving to a monetary union unambiguously accrues the central bank's temptation to in ‡ate, this paper shows that such a monetary policy regime shift may either favour or inhibit wage discipline. Wage setters are found to behave less aggressively in the monetary union relative to a regime of uncoordinated monetary policies, provided the central bank is not too conservative. 1 This point has been stressed by Zervoyanni [1997] , Grüner and Hefeker [1999] , Cukierman and Lippi [2000] and Soskice and Iversen [1998] , among others.
For an intuitive account of this result, consider the unions' perception of the in ‡ationary consequences of their wage claims in the two monetary policy regimes. Under non-cooperative national monetary policies, each union understands that the increase in its own wage raises domestic in ‡ation to an extent that is larger the bigger the union and the lower the central bank's in‡ation aversion. When switching to a monetary union, the weight of domestic wages in the union-wide in ‡ation rate reduces. Labour unions, however, may nonetheless perceive higher in ‡ationary repercussions of their wage hikes as they correctly anticipate the response of the uni…ed central bank to wage pressure to be stronger than the one of national central banks for the same degree of conservativeness. This latter e¤ect is higher the less conservative the central bank. As higher in ‡ation awareness on the part of unions favours wage restraint, not too conservative a central bank may then turn out to induce a less aggressive wage behaviour in a monetary union relative to a regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies.
In contrast to ] ; this paper further shows that international monetary policy cooperation may be e¤ective in reducing wage in ‡ation. In our setup, the union-wide in ‡ation rate falls short of the one under uncoordinated national monetary policies when wage setting is internationally centralised and the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative, namely when wage restraint is strong enough so as to compensate for the in ‡ationary consequences of central bank's behaviour.
Since the contributions by Velasco and Guzzo [1999] and Lippi [2000] , it is well-known that monetary institutions, such as central bank's conservativeness, may permanently a¤ect the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment through their e¤ects on strategic wage setting. The results in this paper may be read as extending this insight to a particular monetary policy regime shift, by showing that the macroeconomic consequences of establishing a monetary union may depend in a non-linear way on central banking institutions. 2 Strategic interactions between the uni…ed central bank and wage setters as those analysed in this paper may be relevant in determining the in ‡ation-ary performance in the EMU, as several European countries are characterised by intermediate to high centralisation in wage bargaining. 3 The results in 2 The signi…cance of unionised wage setting for the otpimal design of central banking institutions in a closed economy is analysed, among others, by Lawler [2000] . the paper stress the harmful consequences of establishing the anti-in ‡ation credententials of the European Central Bank (ECB) through the standard Barro-Gordon way of reputation building. Our analysis suggests that appointing an ultra-conservative central banker at the ECB and imparting a "de ‡ationary bias" in the conduct of the European monetary policy, besides the usual costs in terms of employment, may turn out to threaten the ECB's anti-in ‡ationary credibility. 4 This paper is closely related to a contribution by Cukierman and Lippi [2000] ; which analyses the implications of the establishment of a monetary union for strategic wage behaviour. Three main distinguishing features characterise the approach proposed in this paper. Firstly, we explicitly derive demands for both labour and goods from pro…t and utility maximization, while Cukierman and Lippi adopt a partial equilibrium approach. Secondly, our framework encompasses trade across the countries in the monetary union. Finally, we make a …rst step towards a welfare-based analysis of the strategic interactions between central banks and wage setters by specifying preferences for unions and the central bank that are consistent with the behavioral analysis. Building on our micro-founded framework, we are able to show that the establishment of a monetary union may induce a more or less aggressive wage behaviour, thus increasing or decreasing area-wide in ‡ation for a given level of employment, while only the former e¤ect may appear in their model. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a reduced-form representation of the two-country world economy. Section 3 describes the one-shot game between the central bank and the unions in the two monetary policy regimes. In section 4, the equilibrium outcomes under uncoordinated national monetary policies and a monetary union are compared in the case of uncoordinated national wage setting as well as under international wage centralisation. Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix, the model of a twocountry world economy is laid out. unemployment as well as on the likely e¤ects of EMU on those institutions. 4 This accords with the views expressed in Allsopp and Vines [1998] favouring the development of an appropriate reaction function rather than the establishment of a tough anti-in ‡ationary reputation as the main task of the ECB. A similar conclusion is drawn by Bean [1998 and n ¤¡1 ; respectively: Each union sets nominal wages on behalf of its members.
The reduced-form representation
In each country, two reduced-form equations are needed for studying the monetary policy game (a detailed description of the economy is provided in the Appendix). The …rst one is obtained by substituting aggregate demand for the domestic good (A8) and optimal price-setting (A10) into the demand for labour of type i (A3) and taking logarithms
where w i is the growth of the nominal wage of labour of type i, w is the aggregate nominal wage growth, and ¼ is the in ‡ation rate.
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The second reduced-form equation is derived by substituting labour demand (A3) and nominal aggregate pro…ts into the individual budget constraint (A6). Since unions are assumed to take aggregate pro…ts as given, this gives
where c i is (the log of) real consumption. The central bank does not take aggregate pro…ts as given when choosing monetary policy and faces the following reduced-form budget constraint
By normalising the previous period nominal wage to unity, the current nominal wage can be expressed as
where w i is the percent increase in the nominal wage of worker i. In the text, the following approximations are used: log( Wi W ) = w i ¡ w and log(
Three equations parallel to (1)-(3) hold for the foreign country.
Central bank's preferences
In the regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies, the objective function of both the domestic and foreign central bank is designed so as to trade o¤ the average utility of their respective population with the dislike of country-speci…c in ‡ation
where U is the utility function (A4). The parameter¯captures the weight of in ‡ation relative to other policy targets and represents the central bank's degree of "conservativeness" (Rogo¤
The common central bank also cares about the average utility of the agents in the monetary union while she dislikes average in ‡ation
where
In specifying the central bank's preferences (4) and (5), we have assumed that monetary conservativeness does not vary, so as to focus on in ‡ation targeting as the only di¤erence across monetary policy regimes. While domestic and foreign central banks aim at controlling country-speci…c in ‡ation, the uni…ed central bank has an average in ‡ation target. 6 As will become apparent soon, this alters the central bank's incentive to in ‡ate as well as nominal wage setting.
Unions' preferences
Each domestic and foreign union is interested in the average utility of its members 6 The central bank in a monetary union could also target union-wide in ‡ation. However, this would not be consistent with the way in ‡ation targeting is actually practiced. The ECB's in ‡ation target, for example, is speci…ed in terms of a harmonised consumption price index.
It is worth stressing that we abstract from unions' in ‡ation aversion, so as to focus on the monetary policy regime shift as the only incentive for wage restraint. 7 
Strategic monetary policy
This section describes the one-shot, two-stage game between national central banks and labour unions in a monetary union, U, and in a regime of uncoordinated monetary policies, N.
In the …rst stage, each national union sets the rate of growth of the nominal wage of its members in an uncoordinated way relative to both foreign and other national unions. After wages are set, the uni…ed central bank picks the average in ‡ation rate in the monetary union, while each national central bank chooses the country-speci…c in ‡ation rate in the uncoordinated monetary policy regime. Finally, given real wages …rms choose employment and produce the traded goods. The game is solved by backward induction.
The central bank's problem
In the regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies, the domestic central bank chooses the national in ‡ation rate so as to maximize (4) subject to (1) and (3), which yields the reaction function
An equation similar to (7) 
In the monetary union, the uni…ed central bank chooses the average in ‡a-tion rate so as to maximize the utility of all agents in the union (5) subject to (1) and (3) and their foreign analogues. The central bank's optimal strategy is
Building on (9), domestic and foreign unions calculate the union-wide in ‡ationary impact of their wage claims
Comparing (8) and (10), it appears that the monetary policy regime shift has two opposing e¤ects on the way domestic and foreign unions perceive the in ‡ationary consequences of their wage claims.
On one hand, the establishment of a monetary union decreases the perceived in ‡ationary impact of national wage hikes, as unions are smaller relative to the whole population in the monetary union (this is captured by the …rst addend in brackets). A one percent increase in domestic wages, in fact, has an impact on the domestic aggregate price level and hence on domestic in ‡ation equal to 1/2 percent, while this halves to 1/4 percent when the average in ‡ation rate in the monetary union is considered.
On the other hand, switching from uncoordinated monetary policies to a monetary union accrues the central bank's temptation to in ‡ate (as captured by the second addend in brackets). Under uncoordinated monetary policies, in fact, national central banks are refrained from generating surprise in ‡ation due to the exchange rate costs that follow unilateral monetary expansions, while these costs obviously disappear in the monetary union. This in turn may increase the unions' in ‡ation awareness, as unions perceive the response of the common central bank to an increase in nominal wages to be stronger than the one of national central banks.
As will become apparent later, a high in ‡ation awareness on the part of unions favours wage moderation as it leads each union to internalise the reduction in the real wage of other unions that follows the increase in its own wage. 8 Whether the switch to a monetary union may discipline wage setters then crucially depends on which one of the two opposing e¤ects discussed above prevails. It can be easily shown that the perceived in ‡ationary consequences of an increase in domestic wages are higher in a monetary union relative to a regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies provided the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative. Using (8) and (10) it is immediate to obtain
The unions' problem
Under simultaneous bargaining, each national union sets the rate of growth of the nominal wage of its members so as to maximize (6) subject to (1), (2), the central bank's reaction function in the appropriate monetary policy regime, i.e. (7) or (9), and taking as given the nominal wages set by other unions at home and abroad. The optimal non-cooperative strategy of the domestic union i is
where » r is the elasticity of labour demand to the nominal wage of union i in the monetary policy regime r = U; N 
9
An analogous equation describes the behaviour of the foreign union i ¤ : A unitary increase in the nominal wage of union i has two contrasting e¤ects on its members' utility. On one side, utility decreases since consumption reduces (this is captured by the term in brackets in (12)), while on the other side the increase in leisure raises utility. 9 Each union's optimal nominal wage is then set so as to balance these costs and bene…ts.
It is apparent in (12) that a high in ‡ation awareness on the part of unions, a high s, reduces the marginal utility of consumption while raising the marginal disutility of labour e¤ort. As output is sub-optimally low due to monopolistic distortions, this will reduce unions' welfare and will thus discipline wage bevahiour.
Drawing on the constant relation between increases in nominal and real relative wages, dw i =d ln(W i =P ) = 1= (1 ¡ s r ), we can cast the …rst order condition (12) in terms of the real e¤ects of the union's nominal wage, obtaining
where´r´» r = (1 ¡ s r ) is the elasticity of the demand for labour of type i to the real relative wage in regime r.
Using (13) and (8) or (10) when appropriate, the elasticity of labour demand to the real wage in the two monetary regimes can be easily expressed in terms of the model's parameterś
In ‡ation under alternative monetary regimes
Under uncoordinated national monetary policies, the Home and Foreign in‡ation rates can be obtained by combining the respective unions' equilibrium strategies (12) in a symmetric equilibrium, (`i =`), with the central bank's reaction function (7), which yields the area-wide average in ‡ation rate 9 The overall e¤ect of the increase in the nominal wage of union i on consumption is negative, since the e¤ect of the increase in the real wage (1¡s) is smaller than the reduction in labor demand (»).
For the well-known reason discussed in Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983] , equilibrium in ‡ation is sub-optimally positive. Other than on central bank's in ‡ation aversion,¯, the economy's in ‡ationary bias depends on labour market features as synthesised in the elasticities´N and´¤ N . Using (15) it is easy to verify that equilibrium in ‡ation is higher the less substitutable the di¤erent types of labour and the more decentralised the wage bargaining structure. 10 A similar procedure that combines (12) and (9) yields the equilibrium in ‡ation rate in the monetary union
Comparing the area-wide in ‡ation rates in the two monetary regimes, (16) and (17), it appears that in the absence of strategic e¤ects -i.e., when´U = N and´¤ U =´¤ N -in ‡ation under uncoordinated national monetary policies is unambiguously lower than the one in a monetary union. The reason is the stronger incentive for the common central bank to resort to surprise in ‡ation relative to national central banks ).
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This matches with the empirical regularity documented by Romer [1993] showing that more open economies have a better in ‡ationary performance in a broad cross-section of countries. 12 When wage setters are large, however, the move to a monetary union also a¤ects wage behaviour and hence in ‡ation in a direction that is not clear a priori. As already discussed, the establishment of a monetary union may 10 This accords with the analysis in Cubitt [1992] In our setup, the common central bank has an incentive to in ‡ate four time higher than the one of national central banks. This depends on two factors that are at work also in a more general framework, namely the economy's degree of openness and the type of in ‡ation targeting. In our speci…cation, trade openness is 1/2 under uncoordinated national monetary policies, while the monetary union is a closed economy. This accounts for the common central bank having twice an incentive to in ‡ate relative to national central banks. By the same token, average versus country-speci…c in ‡ation targeting amounts to a double temptation to in ‡ate in our setting. favour wage restraint, provided the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative. This in turn will reduce the economy's in ‡ationary bias for a given level of employment, by increasing the elasticities of labour demand in (17) relative to the ones in (16).
International wage coordination
In our setup, wage discipline under a monetary union, when it occurs, is not able to compensate for the increase in the union-wide in ‡ationary bias due to central bank's behaviour. This leads one to question under what circumstances would such a wage restraint e¤ect be strong enough to reduce in ‡ation. An obvious candidate is the case of international wage coordination, where wage discipline is at its best. As recently stressed in the literature on nominal wage bargaining, the switch to a monetary union is likely to alter the structure of wage setting across the member countries, although opinions diverge as to the directions of this change. 13 As an example of international wage coordination, consider a sovra-national union that sets domestic and foreign nominal wages so as to maximise the average utility of the population in the monetary union, which for simplicity is assumed to consist of two perfectly symmetric regions
under (1), (2) and the uni…ed central bank's reaction function (9) . This yields the optimal strategy
and the superscript W stands for wage centralisation. The sovra-national union uses (9) so as to compute the perceived in ‡ationary impact of an increase in domestic and foreign wages,
Following the same steps as before, we can easily derive equilibrium in ‡ation under international wage coordination
Comparing (16) and (22), it is easy to verify that, di¤erently from national wage bargaining, in ‡ation in the monetary union may fall short of the one under uncoordinated national monetary policies when wage setting is internationally centralised. We can further show that this holds true provided the central bank is not too conservative. Using (8 )and (15) as well as (21) and (20) in, respectively, (16) and (22), we obtain
2 (µ ¡ 1) (n ¡ 1) and¯¤ is the positive root of the equation in (23).
For an intuitive account of this result, consider that under wage centralisation the switch to a monetary union always disciplines wage behaviour, as the sovra-national union internalises the higher incentive to accomodate wage in ‡ation of the common central bank relative to national central banks. The overall e¤ect of the monetary policy regime shift on in ‡ation then depends on whether wage restraint is strong enough so as to compensate for the higher central bank's temptation to in ‡ate. A less in ‡ation averse central bank, by increasing the in ‡ation awareness of the sovra-national union while not a¤ecting the central bank's incentive to in ‡ate across monetary regimes, may induce a less aggressive wage behaviour and hence lower in ‡ation in the monetary union. 14 As countries are symmetric, foreign and domestic wages are equal.
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Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region world economy, this paper has analysed the behaviour of large wage-setters when switching from a regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies to a monetary union.
Provided the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative, we have shown that the switch from uncoordinated monetary policies to a monetary union may favour wage restraint. We have also shown that wage discipline may reduce equilibrium in ‡ation in a monetary union relative to the one under uncoordinated national monetary policies if wage setting is centralised across the members of the monetary union.
Appendix
Home production function is
where Y represents output of the domestic good and µ > 1 captures the degree of substitutability among di¤erent labour types.
Let W i represent the Home nominal wage of worker i. Then, W , the price index for labour inputs, is de…ned as the minimal nominal cost of producing a unit of output
Cost minimization implies …rms' demand for labour of type i is
Agents' utility is given by
where the real consumption index C aggregates consumption of the domestic good C H and consumption of the foreign good
In this setup, economic size, as measured by the weight of Home goods in world consumption, coincides with population size. While markets are complete domestically (everyone owns an equal share of all domestic …rms), there is no international equity trade. As will become apparent later, this assumption is benign. Given the Cobb-Douglas preferences over domestic and foreign goods (A5) and the separability of individuals' utility functions, in fact, international equity trade would not a¤ect equilibrium outcomes.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is
where D j are nominal aggregate pro…ts. Home' and Foreign's current account, which are obtained by aggregating (A6) in the interval (0; ; 1) respectively, are balanced when consumption is equalized across countries
Then, aggregate demand for both the Home and the Foreign good is a linear function of world consumption, C
where P H is the nominal price of the domestic good, P F is the domesticcurrency price of the foreign good after normalising the nominal exchange rate to one and P is the nominal price index de…ned as
It is easy to verify that pro…t-maximizing …rms will set the nominal price for the good they produce equal to the aggregate nominal wage 
